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I. INTRODUCTION
If the old maxim is true, that "all politics is local," then even more so is
the principle true that all public education is local. 2 Recent case law develop-
ments also suggest that plaintiffs who are unhappy about a problem in education
are increasingly seeking relief from local legal resources, such as going to state
court to litigate state law matters,3 rather than seeking relief under federal law.
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. DePauw Univer-
sity; M.Ed. Valparaiso University; J.D. Indiana University-Indianapolis. I extend my many
thanks to my research assistants who kept all these statutes straight and up-to-date: Katherine
Lord, Lori Marschke, and Chuck Waller.
"Our citizenship in the United States is our national character. Our citizenship in any par-
ticular state is only our local distinction. By the latter we are known at home, by the former to the
world." Thomas Paine, The Last Crisis (April 19, 1783), in THE SELECTED WORK OF TOM PAINE
86 (Howard Fast ed., Duell, Sloan & Pearce 1945) (emphasis added).
2 "By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
3 One of the starkest examples of the switch from the relative toothlessness of federal litiga-
tion to the power of the "local option" of state litigation is in school funding equity cases. After
plaintiffs failed to receive relief from Texas's state and local funding legislation in federal court
and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in San Antonio Independent
1
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A similar trend is increasingly apparent in privacy cases: State constitutions are
becoming the refuge for privacy protection if the federal courts are viewed as
sidestepping the issue, at least in matters of Fourth Amendment search and sei-
zure jurisprudence and of decisional privacy.4 Such a development is also in-
creasingly likely in the confluence of education and privacy problems in matters
of education informational privacy, especially privacy of student records. Plain-
tiffs will abandon litigation under federal laws because those laws are ineffec-
tive and instead will enforce their privacy rights under state law.
State privacy laws have proved more effective at protecting privacy for
at least three reasons. First, they typically create an affirmative right to privacy.
Next, states are more willing to vociferously protect their citizens' privacy
rights. Last, these statutes are more likely to be privately enforceable by indi-
viduals. Thus, school districts have more to fear from state privacy laws and
the growing trend toward state litigation than they do from federal laws. Hence,
this Article will attempt to examine major areas of state privacy law - constitu-
tions, statutes, and regulations - to which school districts must be attentive
when dealing with student records.5
Part II will review the backdrop for plaintiffs' abandoning federal laws
for state law protections over student record privacy. Part 1H1 will examine state
constitutional privacy provisions, where states have made privacy a fundamental
right. Part IV will take up specifically dedicated state statutes and regulations
that provide privacy protection to student records. Last, Part V will deal with
exemptions in state sunshine laws that protect student record privacy. This Ar-
ticle is designed to educate about this little known but increasingly important
niche in privacy protection for the records of public schoolchildren,6 and to alert
school districts that observing federal privacy laws may no longer be enough
protection from litigation.
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), they were measurably more successful in attack-
ing the same legislation in the Texas state court and under the Texas Constitution in Edgewood
Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See also Ken Gormley, One
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1420-1422 (1992) [hereinafter Gormley, 100
Years].
4 See Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy & the States, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1279,
1280 (1992); Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3, at 1423-25.
5 There is, unfortunately, little way that an Article such as this can address all the individual
state privacy laws that might protect student records. As soon as this piece is published, some
state will amend its statutes or enact a new one. However, this Article observes trends and warns
about general categories of concern. This Article will also not address the privacy issues raised by
the various states' military access statutes that require schools to give personal information to
military recruiters. As of the writing of this Article, those statutes may be subject to challenge
pending the Supreme Court's decision on the federal version of the military access statute in Fo-
rum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
6 This Article is limited to the student records of K-12 public school students although higher
education privacy protections may be addressed tangentially and as exemplars when K- 12 analo-
gies and cases are absent.
[Vol. 108
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss2/5
A LOCAL DISTINCTION
II. BACKGROUND
Until recently, school districts and other authorities considered federal
law the primary source of protection for the privacy of public school records.
One such source of solace was the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.
7
A statute ostensibly enacted to protect student and family privacy in public
school records, FERPA provides procedures for the limited disclosure of and
access to "education records."8 Any school district with a'policy or practice of
defying these procedures may lose its federal funding. 9 Although there was
some debate whether FERPA was actually a privacy statute or merely a funding
statute,'0 Gonzaga University v. Doe" rendered that distinction virtually moot
for an individual's privacy right. In that case, the Supreme Court of the United
States determined that FERPA provides no personal rights to persons seeking to
enforce the privacy "promised" by the statute.12 As a consequence, children
(and their parents) who believe their privacy has been compromised by noncon-
sensual disclosure of or access to their student records will search for alternative
recourse for protection. State laws are the likely candidates for that recourse.
Gonzaga University v. Doe is instructive in this manner because plain-
tiff Doe - although unsuccessful on his FERPA claim - did prevail on his state
law claim for the common law tort of invasion of privacy.' 3 So too might other
individuals who alternatively plead state law claims when seeking a remedy for
a breach of privacy occasioned by an unlawful disclosure of student records.
Indeed, some of these state law claims could provide more than just minimal
injunctive relief; plaintiff Doe was awarded over $100,000 for invasion of pri-
vacy. 14
However, this Article is not exclusively about litigation; it is also about
compliance with the law. The general privacy resource that school districts re-
7 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
8 Id. § 1232g(a)(4).
9 Id. § 1232g(b)(l).
10 Compare Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. Newspapers, Inc. v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 787
N.E.2d 893, 903-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (FERPA requires that student records be kept confiden-
tial) with Red & Black Publ'g Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 427 S.E.2d 257, 261 (Ga. 1993) (FERPA
does not prohibit disclosure of student records; it only regulates funding based on policies of
releasing student records).
11 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
12 Id. at 287.
13 Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390 (2001), rev'd in part, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
14 Id. Doe prevailed on his invasion of privacy claim regarding the internal investigation of
his alleged misconduct that eventually led Gonzaga University to refuse to give the moral charac-
ter affidavit Doe needed to obtain his teaching certification. Id. at 399-400. This particular type
of invasion of privacy is not one that a student might traditionally pursue for unlawful disclosure
of student records. However, Doe's victory does stand for the proposition that plaintiffs might
seek and be awarded more than de minimis damages under state law claims for invasion of privacy
rather than the administrative slap on the hand threatened by FERPA.
2005]
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ceive for creating local privacy policies usually derives from Guidances issued
by the Department of Education that are, perforce, incomplete because they are
only about federal laws, and not about state laws. Those Guidances can be mis-
leading because federal laws do not protect student privacy well. Thus, this
Article is intended to serve notice that the Guidances do not, that numerous state
laws - constitutions in particular - demand more privacy protection from school
districts than federal laws demand. School districts must note that local distinc-
tion and prepare for protecting the greater privacy demanded by their respective
state.
States may not legislate fewer rights than afforded by the United States
Constitution, but they may and have legislated greater rights than afforded by
the Constitution. 5 In particular, states have created greater rights with respect
to privacy in contrast to federal law. The Supreme Court has not unequivocally
determined that privacy exists or is protected under the Constitution. Indeed, it
is not even clear that the Supreme Court recognizes a right to informational pri-
vacy, a specific privacy right that would afford protection for student records.'
6
Furthermore, federal legislation purporting to protect such student informational
privacy has more holes than a sieve. 17 As a consequence, state laws - constitu-
tions, statutes, regulations, common law - can be daubed in the holes to protect
student privacy where the Constitution and federal laws cannot or will not.'8
Part of the problem school districts face in this area is that state privacy
laws have not always been given their due as most people have been enamored
with the federal statutes, especially FERPA. However, school districts who put
all their privacy eggs in the federal basket may still have problems with their
local statutes and constitutions because of the absolute absence of any genuine
15 States may provide greater rights than those afforded by the Constitution, especially liberty
interests (of which privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).
16 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REv. 553, 574-76 (1994-95).
17 See, e.g., Susan P. Stuart, Lex-Praxis of Education Informational Privacy for Public School-
children, 48 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Stuart, Lex-Praxis].
18 There seems to be no conflict in recognizing greater privacy rights granted by state law than
offered by federal law. The Supremacy Clause only requires preemption of state law by federal
law when there exists an explicit indication of preemption by Congress, when it is a physical
impossibility to comply with both state and federal law at the same time, or when state law is an
obstacle to the federal purpose. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2; see, e.g., C.T.S. Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982). Little is suggested in any of the applicable federal privacy statutes that
any such conflicts would arise in matters of states' granting privacy rights to its citizens, particu-
larly in expanding liberty interests (of which privacy is arguably one). See, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at
300. The only exception appears to be that state privacy rights may have to give way to federal
discovery requests. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1063-
64 (7th Cir. 1981) (unauthorized disclosure provisions of state medical records statute preempted
by discovery request in federal antitrust case); United States ex rel. Agency for Int'l Dev. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Md., 866 F. Supp. 884, 886-87 (D. Md. 1994) (procedures in state confidential
records act preempted by federal agency subpoena power).
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privacy protections in federal statutes.19 School districts may be forgiven this
misunderstanding as the federal government, especially the Department of Edu-
cation, has insinuated itself more and more into the regulation of education, and
school districts and school boards have forgotten what "local control" really is.
However, their constituents have not forgotten nor have their lawyers.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS: PRIVACY AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Unlike the United States Constitution, a handful of state constitutions
specifically use the word "privacy" in their provisions. Others, like the Consti-
tution, have been interpreted to include privacy within their "penumbras. 20
These provisions - whether express or implied - and the resulting interpretive
case law have been characterized as a "laboratory" for the protection of privacy
rights. 21 Although some explicit provisions have been around since statehood,
others have been added as the Supreme Court has grown more conservative and
less inclined to recognize privacy rights.22 Thus, states have been amending
their constitutions to create new privacy rights in recent decades.23  Similarly,
other states have discovered penumbral privacy in more general provisions of
24their respective constitutions during the same time period. These provisions
and judicial interpretations were originally designed to expand Fourth Amend-
ment and decisional-autonomy privacy rights. 25 These implicit provisions of
privacy, along with the explicit provision, have become shelter for informational
privacy and therefore are a potential source for protecting student records.
A. Explicit Constitutional Privacy Rights
Unlike the United States Constitution, ten states have constitutions pro-
viding explicit privacy rights that could afford protection to personal informa-
tion.26 Those states are Alaska, 27 Arizona,28 California,29 Florida,30 Hawai'i, 31
19 I posit in a separate article that there is an absolute privacy protection under the Constitu-
tion. Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education Privacy as
Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 563 (2004) [hereinafter Stuart, Primer].
20 See generally Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3.
21 Id. at 1428-31.
22 Id. at 1423-25.
23 Id.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 92-129.
25 Gormley, 100 Years, supra note 3 at 1425.
26 Id. at 1423-24; Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1282-83. This list does not include
those states whose constitutions provide a specific right to privacy to crime victims: IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 22; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 24; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 9m.
27 "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed .... ALASKA
CONST. art. 1, § 22 (emphasis added).
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Illinois, 32 Louisiana, 33 Montana, 34 South Carolina, 35 and Washington. 36  Al-
though the language in some of these provisions clearly reflects Fourth
Amendment-type protections from warrantless searches and seizures, nearly all
of them expressly or impliedly cover more than that. For example, the South
Carolina Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
and unreasonable invasions of privacy ... More broadly, the majority of
these explicit provisions protect an unadulterated, more overarching right to
privacy: "[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be in-
fringed '38 or "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest." 39 Florida's Constitution has one of the most expansive privacy provi-
sions: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from govern-
mental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided
28 "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law." ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (emphasis added).
29 "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
30 "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into
the person's private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed
to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 23 (emphasis added).
31 "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest .. " HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added).
32 "The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other pos-
sessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of commu-
nications by eavesdropping devices or other means ...... ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis
added).
33 "Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy .... " LA. CONST. art. 1, §
5 (emphasis added).
34 "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 10 (em-
phasis added).
35 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated ...
" S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
36 "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority
of law." WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
37 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. A shorter
variation exists in Arizona's and Washington's Constitutions: "No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; WASH.
CONST. art. 1, § 7.
38 ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22; HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
39 MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
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herein. ' 4° This greater coverage is significant because, unlike the Constitution,
these state constitutions either do or can unequivocally protect information pri-
vacy.
Even more significant is the emphasis the state courts put on these ex-
plicit constitutional provisions when they interpret privacy as a state-endowed
fundamental right.4' One state constitution itself even ascribes inalienability to
this privacy right.42 At the state level, this particular explicit right shares the
protections inuring to the rights and freedoms of speech, religion, and associa-
tion. Consequently, this right of privacy does not suffer the incertitude assigned
to a federal, constitutional right of privacy. Instead, what is also fairly universal
in most of these jurisdictions is the certitude that state constitutional privacy
rights are greater than federal constitutional privacy rights.4 3
For instance, Alaska's constitutional privacy protects marijuana posses-
sion in one's own home. 44 Similarly, Arizona's constitutional provision protects
the right to refuse medical treatment, and hence protects the right to die.45 Cali-
fornia has even extended protection over its citizens' privacy by interpreting its
constitution to apply to private intrusions, not just to governmental intrusions. 46
Because of this explicit language and expansive interpretation, these
courts have expanded these state constitutional privacy provisions to protect the
right to autonomy and the right to be left alone and, thus, to protect informa-
tional privacy, 47 decision-making privacy,48 and Fourth Amendment physical
privacy.49 Thus, some state courts have afforded expansive privacy rights un-
der these explicit provisions that are difficult to attain in federal constitutional
decisions. One court used such a provision to stake out a broad area of coverage
40 FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
41 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D.B., 784 So. 2d 585, 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v.
State, 989 P.2d 364, 373-74 (Mont. 1999). See generally Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940
P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
42 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
43 See, e.g., Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808; Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So. 2d at 588; State v. Kam, 748 P.2d
372, 377 (Haw. 1988); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002); People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Il1. 2004); State v. Vikesdal, 688 So. 2d 685,
691 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d at 373-74; State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46,
49 (Wash. 2002).
44 State v. Crocker, 97 P.3d 93, 94 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the provision "pro-
tects an adult's right to possess a limited amount of marijuana in their [sic] home for personal use"
(citing Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975)).
45 Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987).
46 Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994); Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
47 See, e.g., State v. Lester, 649 P.2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982).
48 See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
49 See, e.g., Hill, 865 P.2d 633.
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that protects "[a] private affairs interest[,] an object or a matter personal to an
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person.,
50
Similarly, another court prefers to keep its constitutional definition of "privacy"
flexible and relevant to the circumstances of each case,5' while a sister court
asserts that its state's constitutional provision establishes a zone of privacy
"broadly and without restrictions." 52 One court extended privacy so far as to
embrace common law concepts, that the right to privacy in the constitution is
the equivalent of the right to be let alone. The court stated that the constitu-
tional provision means to be free of public scrutiny, to be free from unreason-
able intrusions into one's private affairs, and to be free from intrusion upon se-
clusion.5 3
Under any interpretation of these state constitutional privacies, the
courts usually employ a test that is similar to the one derived from Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence: Is there a reasonable expectation of privacy?54 Sev-
eral states use such a reasonable expectation starting point - Alaska,55 Califor-
nia,56 Florida,57 Illinois, 58 and Louisiana.59 The state courts' threshold test will
protect a subjective expectation of privacy "that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.,, 60 As a result, some courts have adopted a two-step examination
for testing privacy interests. First, the court will examine the individual's sub-jective expectation of privacy; second, it will examine whether or not society is
50 State v. Hepton, 54 P.3d 233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
51 Hill, 865 P.2d at 651.
52 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State,
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
53 Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La.
1997). These three privacies are all protected under tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652(A) (1977).
54 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
55 Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990).
56 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811 (Cal. 1997); Bearman v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review denied (June 30, 2004).
57 Commitment of Smith v. State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1030 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).
58 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004); A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State,
772 N.E.2d 362, 370 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
59 Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La.
1997); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct.
App. 2004), writ denied 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005).
60 Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738 (internal quotation omitted); see also Capital City Press v. E.
Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d 562, 566 (La. 1997); State v. Hepton, 54 P.3d
233, 238 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) ("A private affairs interest is an object or a matter personal to an
individual such that any intrusion on it would offend a reasonable person.").
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willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. 61 That examination neces-
sarily has some limits.
To be sure, these state constitutional rights are not necessarily absolute
rights,62 particularly as suggested by the limitations set by the reasonableness of
one's expectation of privacy. State constitutional privacy rights may be broader
than federal rights, but they might still have to give way to other interests. They
may have to give way to the public interest - on a case-by-case basis63 - or give
way to the rights of others. 64 But nearly uniformly, government intrusions on
these constitutional provisions trigger strict scrutiny because of the provisions'
status as fundamental rights.65 Therefore, such intrusion passes constitutional
muster only if there is a compelling state interest66 and the intrusion is effected
by the least restrictive means.67 Consequently, these explicit state constitutional
provisions grant broader protections to their citizens than does the Constitution
61 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); E. Bank Consol. Special
Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004), writ denied 897 So. 2d
608 (La. 2005); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 967 (Mont. 1984);
State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002).
62 See, e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298; Capital City Press, 696
So. 2d at 566.
63 See, e.g., Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); E.
Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 669 (La. Ct. App. 2004),
writ denied, 897 So. 2d 608 (La. 2005). One of those important public interests is government
transparency under state open records laws. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. D.B., 784 So. 2d
585, 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). However, the variations of disclosure under and in compli-
ance with open records acts is beyond the scope of this Article. In any case, that raises the ques-
tion of whether or not school records are public records under state law and, therefore, even come
under the jurisdiction of the open records acts. There is an argument that some student records are,
in reality, private records for which schools are only the bailee. See Stuart, Primer, supra note 19,
at 637-39.
64 State, Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. McCorkle, 694 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
65 G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1062; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081; Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364,
374 (Mont. 1999).
66 See, e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738; Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811
(Cal. 1997) ("compelling interest" test applies in autonomy privacy); Commitment of Smith v.
State, 827 So. 2d 1026, 1031 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002); Bd. of County Comm'rs, 784 So. 2d at 588;
State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372, 378 (Haw. 1988); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374.
67 See, e.g., Jennings, 788 P.2d at 738 ("least intrusive"); Commitment of Smith, 827 So. 2d at
1031; McCorkle, 694 So. 2d at 1081 ("narrowly defined"); Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374 (Mont.
1999) ("narrowly tailored"); see also Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298 (constitutional provision pro-
tects from "unreasonable" invasions of privacy). To be sure, there is an occasional variation to this
commonly recognized constitutional scrutiny: in Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994), the
California Supreme Court - in a student-athlete drug-testing case - used a "balancing test" that
weighed the particular privacy interest against a legitimate governmental (or, here, private) inter-
est. Id. at 655. Another California case only required "good cause" to support a subpoena for
medical records. Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 647-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),
review denied, (June 30, 2004). However, the more consistent test used by the state courts in
testing their constitutional privacy rights is strict scrutiny.
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by according citizens a fundamental right to privacy, even to minors.68 The
question remains about their coverage over minors' student records.
Regardless of the language, the majority of this type of state constitu-
tional provisions protects informational privacy in general and, therefore, likely
protects student records in particular. 69 Protections in at least three states recog-
nize informational privacy as an overarching, general concept derived from the
constitutional provision. In California, informational privacy is protected as the
interest "in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential
information. 70 And "[a] particular class of information is private when well-
established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over
its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity., 7
1
Likewise, Montana72 and Hawai'i 73 broadly recognize informational privacy as
within the particular ambit of their constitutions.
The remaining states also seem to provide coverage for informational
privacy, but the analysis is derived in response to particular problems; they have
not yet thrown a protective blanket over information per se. Because the quere
before these courts did not strike so generally, representative cases address on a
piecemeal basis the protection of specific types of information. Particularly
protected in these cases are health care information,74 evaluation procedures and
personnel matters concerning public employees,75 taped conversations,76 phone
68 E.g., B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1995); S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d
953, 958 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lungren, 940 P.2d at 814; In re T.A.J., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331,
334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
69 To date, only South Carolina and Arizona seem not to have addressed informational privacy
cases under their respective constitutions. South Carolina's situation might be best attributable to
the fact that it is more akin to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure privacy issues than pri-
vacy in general. That is not to say that information privacy would not be protected by these two
states' provisions. Such apparently limiting language has not stopped other states from interpret-
ing their own provisions to provide broader than expected information protection. See, e.g., ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
70 Lungren, 940 P.2d at 812; Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
71 Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
72 State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 887 (Mont. 2001).
73 State v. Lester, 649 P.2d 346, 353 (Haw. 1982). Hawaii's constitutional provision also
protects the interests formulated in the common law invasion of privacy tort, such as the unauthor-
ized disclosure of personal or embarrassing facts. Id.
74 Bilant, 36 P.3d at 887.
75 Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, L.L.C., 5 Cal. Rptr 3d 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), review
denied (Jan. 22, 2004) (detailed salary information); E. Bank Consol. Special Serv. Fire Prot. Dist.
v. Crossen, 892 So. 2d 666, 670 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (discovery request for assistant fire chief's
complete personnel file denied because such files come within the employee's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy); Trahan v. Larivee, 365 So. 2d 294, 300 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (constitution prohib-
its public access to evaluation reports of city's department directors because they are confidential,
disclosure may inhibit candid and objective evaluations, and disclosure may embarrass or humili-
ate the employee); Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 973 (Mont. 1984)
(constitution protects job performance evaluations of state university presidents for which inter-
viewee had been promised anonymity and confidentiality).
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records,77 private records, 78 personal banking records, 79 confidential therapy
records,80 disclosure of sexual activity on adoption petitions,81 and medical re-
cords.82 Other protections include limits on the disclosure of public employee
records during discovery, such as financial information and family names and
addresses.83 In California, in protecting the identities of an attorney's clients,
the court of appeals protected information, such as financial affairs, political
affiliates, medical history, and sexual relationships.84 Another California deci-
sion protected juvenile court reports on suspected sexual abuse of minors, in-
cluding psychological examinations, social services reports, and hospital re-
ports.85 Not all information is afforded such privacy protection,86 but the trend
among the states favors doing so. Given this overarching protection for a wide
range of information, the imagination is little stretched to include student re-
cords within the analogous coverage of these decisions.
Presently, there seems to be only one published case that deals with the
constitutional protection of student records. In Porten v. University of San
Francisco, a college student sued the University of San Francisco ("USF') for
disclosing grades he earned at Columbia University to the State Scholarship and
Loan Commission.87 Upon his transfer to USF, he had been assured that his
grades from Columbia would be kept confidential and not disclosed to third
parties without his consent. Instead, the USF sent his Columbia transcript to the
76 Lester, 649 P.2d at 353.
77 State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002); but see People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d
1277, 1282-83 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (telephone records are private but are accessible by grand jury
subpoena).
78 People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (II1. 2004).
79 A.G. Edwards, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 772 N.E.2d 362, 369, 371 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
80 S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953, 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
81 G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); but see Borges v. City
of W. Palm Beach, 858 F.Supp. 174 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (constitution did not protect arrest record for
solicitation of prostitution even though found not guilty because it was a public record).
82 Bearman v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
83 Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 739 (Alaska 1990).
84 Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341, 347-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
85 In re Tiffany G., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8, 9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
86 Public employee drug-testing may not be protected information under state constitutional
privacy. McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dept., 799 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Haw. 1990); see also Hill v.
NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 635 (Cal. 1994). In Louisiana, applications for public employment are
accessible to the press. Capital City Press v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Metro. Council, 696 So. 2d
562, 566-67 (La. 1997) (job applications and resumes for position at metropolitan airport authority
are not confidential once they have been submitted). Driver's license records are not historically
protected in Washington. State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 49 (Wash. 2002). And there is no pri-
vacy right in a notice provided to school by a minor under the tort claims act. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Super. Ct., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
87 Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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Commission, even though it was neither needed nor requested. 88 As this was
one of the earliest cases testing the limits of the newly ratified California consti-
tutional privacy provision, the court of appeals enumerated the four primary
"mischiefs" the new provision prohibited: 1) government snooping and gather-
ing personal information in secret; 2) overbroad business and governmental
collection and retention of unnecessary personal information; 3) improper use of
personal information collected for another specific purpose, including improper
disclosure to third parties; and 4) unchecked inaccuracies of information." The
court then determined that Porten's complaint focused on the third mischief,
"improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose." 90 The
court ruled Porten had stated a prima facie violation of California's constitu-
tional provision.91
Therefore, explicit state constitutional privacy provisions likely protect
student records from disclosure to a greater extent than federal law.
B. Implicit Constitutional Privacy Rights
Reaching similar results are those state courts that have divined implicit
privacy rights in their constitutions. The rise of these newly discovered privacy
rights is in no small measure due to hot-button issues in federal litigation, such
as abortion-regulation statutes, restrictions on medical decision-making, and
criminalization of homosexual conduct. Plaintiffs are taking advantage of state
constitutional litigation in these areas because they are more likely to success-
fully protect their autonomy privacy that federal courts are becoming increas-
ingly reluctant to grant under the Constitution.92 States with such implicit pri-
vacy rights currently 93 include Kentucky,94 Minnesota,95 New Hampshire, 96 New
Jersey,97 Pennsylvania,98 Tennessee,99 and Texas. l°°
88 Id.
89 Id. at 842 (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 843-44. The court narrowed its analysis to reach this result after consulting additional
statutory authority in the California Education Code and the newly enacted FERPA. The Porten
court then suggested that the University would have to provide a compelling public interest for the
unauthorized transmission of the Columbia transcript in order to overcome the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Id. Note that later California cases have elided by this strict scrutiny standard. See
supra note 62.
92 See generally Gormley & Hartman, supra note 4, at 1287-89. The Gormley & Hartman
article is a nice compendium of state constitutional privacy cases through 1992.
93 Indiana recently flirted with the notion that it protects a fundamental fight of privacy in
Indiana Constitution art. I, § 1. Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 814 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), vacated 837 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. 2005). The Indiana Supreme Court determined that,
even if Indiana's constitution protects a woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy,
the challenged "waiting-period" statute was not a "material burden" on that right. Id. at 988.
94 Ky. CONST. §§ 1, 2:
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§ 1: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and in-
alienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Third: The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
§ 2: Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority.
See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492-95 (Ky. 1992).
95 MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 2, 10:
§ 1: Government is instituted for the security, benefit and protection of the
people, in whom all political power is inherent, together with the right to alter,
modify or reform government whenever required by the public good.
§ 2: No member of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of
the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the
land or the judgment of his peers....
§ 10: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause ....
See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988).
96 N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 2 & 3:
Art. 2: All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among
which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing,
and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.
Art. 3: When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their
natural rights to that society, in order to ensure the protection of others; and,
without such an equivalent, the surrender is void.
See In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984).
97 N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1 1: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happi-
ness."
See, e.g., In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J.
1976).
98 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1: "All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happi-
ness."
See In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980).
99 TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 8, 19, 27 (Declaration of Rights). Tennessee's broad sanction
of privacy seems to arise from the penumbras of its bill of rights, most particularly (but not exclu-
sively) shaped by Tennessee Constitution art. I, § 8: "[N]o man shall be taken or imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed
or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of hispeers or the law of the land."
See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
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The source of most of these implicit privacy rights is primarily the re-
spective state's bill of rights. More specifically, the source of constitutional
privacy is inherent in the inalienable rights of the state citizens in Kentucky,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. For example, New Jersey's
Constitution provides: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and
have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."'' Similarly worded is
New Hampshire's constitutional provision that protects privacy: "All men have
certain natural, essential, and inherent rights - among which are, the enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property;
and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness.
" °2
The right to privacy is also found in state constitutional due process
provisions, such as in the Minnesota and Tennessee Constitutions: "No member
of this state shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privi-
leges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judg-
ment of his peers .... Or "no man shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty
or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."' 04 Texas's
constitutional right to privacy is even more ephemeral, apparently emanating
from the penumbras of the document itself, the penumbras of being Texan.' 
05
Regardless of the sources, these constitutional provisions protect a pri-
vacy of similar dimensions and with similar scrutiny as their sister jurisdictions
with explicit privacy provisions. However, with the inherent vagueness of any
implication, the state court decisions in these jurisdictions tend to be a little
vaguer in their recognition of a state constitutional right to privacy, in contrast
to the explicit privacy rights. For instance, Texas recognizes zones of privacy
.0 6
while Pennsylvania has a broad privacy right that includes the right to be let
alone 0 7 and the right to prevent disclosure of personal matters. °8 Tennessee's
100 The cases dealing with Texas's right of privacy never specify a particular provision in the
state constitution from which the right arises. Presumably, it is a "penumbral" right, arising from
the nature of the document itself. See, e.g., Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental
Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987); see also TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
101 N.J. CONST. art. 1, 1.
102 N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 2.
103 MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
104 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
105 "We do not doubt ... that a right of individual privacy is implicit among those 'general,
great, and essential principles of liberty and free government' established by the Texas Bill of
Rights." Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995).
106 Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing Tex. State Employees
Union, 746 S.W.2d at 203).
107 Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Pa. 2000) (citing Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992)).
108 In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980).
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constitutional right to privacy is interpreted as "the right to be let alone."' 9
These categories are somewhat fuzzier than those elucidated when the privacy
right is explicit.
In any event, these decisions too assert that these state constitutional
provisions recognize broader privacy interests than the United State Constitu-
tion. 110 Although they acknowledge this constitutional right to privacy is not
absolute,"' they agree it is fundamental." 2 Just as with explicit constitutional
provisions, the implicit provision of privacy must be protected from unreason-
able intrusion, and any such intrusion is subject to strict scrutiny and a compel-
ling state interest' 13 or, at the very least, a countervailing public interest.
14
These implicit constitutional provisions also recognize and usually pro-
tect informational privacy when such privacy is at issue. The6y protect informa-
tional privacy, generally, in Minnesota," 5 New Jersey," Pennsylvania,' 
1 7
Texas 18 and perhaps Tennessee. 19 One court has designated the right as such
"freedom from disclosure of certain matters which an individual deems so per-
sonal that publication adversely affects one's right to the pursuit of life, liberty,
and happiness."' 120 State courts have variously afforded this protection to medi-
109 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d
250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
110 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491, 497 (Ky. 1992); State v. Davidson, 481
N.W.2d 51, 58 (Minn. 1992); Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 261.
Il Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), affd, 383 A.2d 428
(N.J. 1978); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543
A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988).
112 See, e.g., State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 1987).
"3 See, e.g., State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002); In re Caulk, 480
A.2d 93, 95 (N.H. 1984); Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1156; Campbell, 926 S.W.2d at 262; Tex. State
Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203, 205
(Tex. 1987); Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex. App. 1995).
114 Lehrhaupt, 356 A.2d at 41; Fischer, 543 A.2d at 179.
115 Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. No.
1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
116 Lehrhaupt, 383 A.2d at 428.
17 In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980).
118 Fox v. Anonymous, 869 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. App. 1993).
119 Both federal and state courts have determined that the Tennessee Constitution does not
protect the privacy of information. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 480-82 (6th Cir. 1999);
Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999). The reasoning of the former is barely sup-
ported by law and is not binding on a state court while the reasoning of the latter is somewhat
suspect because its underlying and confusing rationale is based on precedent that has nothing to
do with Tennessee's constitutional right to privacy.
120 Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 543 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (citing In re June 1979,415 A.2d 73).
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121 1212
cal reports, financial records, 22 employment records, 23 lists of group mem-
bers, 1 24 identities of victims of sexual assault, 25 polygraph testing by a state
agency, 26 and court records that would reveal a minor's identity and settlement
of his tort claim from a sexual assault by an AIDs-infected counselor.
27
However, the basis for the authority to use implicit constitutional pri-
vacy provisions to protect informational privacy is not nearly as overwhelming
as authority under explicit privacy provisions. Based on the extant published
cases, fewer litigants have used implicit constitutional protections to challenge
government intrusions into citizens' privacy. That is not to say that other juris-
dictions will not recognize informational privacy when the issue arises. If one
examines the vintage of these cases, one notes that they are only ten to fifteen
years old. Fewer implicit privacy provisions have been recognized because,
apparently, fewer implicit privacy provisions have been tested in court. But
with the increased interest in plaintiffs' resorting to state constitutional protec-
tions, the trend to imply privacy rights in those constitutions cannot be ignored
by school districts.
Both explicit and implicit privacy provisions in state constitutions offer
a safe haven to student records that might not be present in the United States
Constitution. Indeed, student records are those documents in which citizens
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As a fundamental right, these state
constitutional privacy rights would take precedence over any conflicting federal
or state statutes that purport to allow disclosure without a compelling state inter-
est. A compelling state interest would obviously embrace legitimate educational
interests in the records, 28 but other non-educational interests should have an
uphill battle arguing for disclosure of this information in these states. Although
not necessarily an exemplar of student records privacy, Porten comes closest to
nailing the real privacy issue: If schools collect personal information from
schoolchildren for a legitimate educational purpose, then by what right may
121 In re June 1979, 415 A.2d at 75-78 (court authorized limited disclosure of medical reports
on tissue specimens pursuant to subpoena only because of grand jury secrecy rules but promised
confidentiality for purposes of further litigation); Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 504.
122 Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 41-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) afftd, 383 A.2d
428 (N.J. 1978) (holding that financial information is protected by constitution but government
transparency requires municipal officials to file annual reports of assets and liabilities); Fox, 869
S.W.2d at 507; see also Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs.,
Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 N.W.2d 107, 110-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (teacher disciplinary
records are not protected from government transparency).
123 Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 504.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Tex. State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746
S.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Tex. 1987).
127 Fox, 869 S.W.2d at 507.
128 E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000).
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schools disclose that information in the absence of a parallel legitimate educa-
tional purpose?
129
School administrators in the affected states must be aware of the growth
in state constitutional litigation and give due consideration to whether compli-
ance with disclosure requests - even under FERPA or state open records acts -
is a wise idea in light of the fundamental protections offered to informational
privacy under their state constitutions. Indeed, school districts in all other states
must be aware of the movement to rely on state constitutions as the source of
privacy rights and be prepared to defend privacy policies that do not stand up to
the strict scrutiny of "need to know."
IV. PRIVACY STATUTES & REGULATIONS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS
A more prevalent type of privacy protection afforded by states is
through legislation; many state statutes provide privacy to student records.
Some state statutes make student records private information as a matter of law.
Such statutes include those that are derived from FERPA and those that simply
afford specific privacy protection to these student records. Similarly, state edu-
cation departments have promulgated regulations that offer privacy protections,
especially for special education records. 130 The "advantage" of these statutes
over federal statutes is that private enforcement is likely available, in contrast to
the limitations placed on FERPA by Gonzaga University v. Doe.
A. Mini-FERPAs: Statutes & Regulations
The majority of states that have developed student record privacy re-
gimes have done so by engrafting the principles of FERPA into their own local
statutes. FERPA is the federal statute that hinges federal funding upon compli-
ance with a statutory framework that denotes what student records may be dis-
closed and to whom.131 Its coverage is comprehensive and detailed in establish-
ing what is an education record subject to protection and what is not, how edu-
cation records can be disclosed and to whom. 132 Although FERPA does not
129 Such limitation on disclosures may even significantly limit the reach non-educational dis-
closures currently allowed under FERPA. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(D) (student aid); 20
U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(1)(E) (juvenile justice authorities); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (b)(1)(J) (grand jury
subpoenas). See generally, Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17.
130 It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the specific protections for all student
information, such as screening tests, individual surveys, etc. The focus here is on privacy protec-
tions that cast their net broadly over student information in education records.
131 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
132 Id.; see generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17; Lynn M. Daggett & Dixie Snow
Huefner, Recognizing Schools' Legitimate Educational Interests: Rethinking FERPA's Approach
to the Confidentiality of Student Discipline and Classroom Records, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2001);
Lynn M. Daggett, Bucking Up Buckley I: Making the Federal Student Records Statute Work, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (1996-97).
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protect students' "directory information" -- name, home address, telephone
number, age, and the like 133 -- it does protect "education records," which are
"records, files, documents, and other materials which . . . contain information
directly related to a student; and ... are maintained by an educational agency or
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution. 1 34 FERPA then
prescribes four primary areas of responsibilities for school districts vis A vis
those records. 135 Those basic areas are providing parental access to student edu-
cation records; supplying notice of that access to parents; regulating the disclo-
sure of education records, particularly nonconsensual disclosure; and regulating
the collection of information in student records. 36 Education records may be
disclosed and/or accessed by certain third parties, but for the most part, those
disclosure and access provisions are rather narrow. 137  Perhaps because of
FERPA's familiarity, a large number of state legislatures have adapted its prin-
ciples, in some shape or form, to govern privacy in their respective states' public
schools.
138
One method of incorporating FERPA into a state privacy regime is to
simply incorporate it by reference to its name and citation. 139 For instance,
Utah's relevant statute states:
Employees and agents of the state's public education system
shall protect the privacy of students, their parents, and their
families ... through compliance with the protections provided
for family and student privacy under . . . the Federal Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act and related provisions un-
der 20 U.S.C. 1232(g) and (h) in the administration and opera-
tion of all public school programs, regardless of the source of
funding. 140
133 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31 (2005).
134 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A).
135 Id. § 1232g.
136 Id.; see also Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17.
137 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
138 See generally Richard A. Leiter, ed., NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 269-74 (5th ed.
2005).
139 ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 15-141 & 15-1043 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 5001-A
(West 2004); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 15.243(2) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (incorporated in open records
act as exemption); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-15-3 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-213(1) (2003);
NEV. REV. ST. §§ 386.650 & 386.655 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:1-e (1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53A-13-301(1) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). Colorado,
curiously enough, has incorporated FERPA into its open records act, thereby regulating disclo-
sure, not privacy. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3) (2004).
140 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-13-301 (2000).
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Nevada's statute simply provides that "the public schools ... shall comply with
the provisions of... the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto .... ,, 141  Similarly pro-
saic are Arizona'S 142 and Maine' S143 wholesale incorporation of FERPA into
their statutory scheme.
That is not to say that state statutes have incorporated FERPA carte
blanche without some adaptation. Some legislatures have incorporated it for
reference only and have still created their own disclosure and access regimes.
For example, Michigan has incorporated FERPA's disclosure exemptions gen-
erally then further exempted (at the discretion of the school district) even direc-
tory information from disclosure for purposes of marketing, surveys and solici-
tation. 144 Mississippi has only incorporated FERPA's parental access provi-
sion 145 whereas Washington has adopted only FERPA's nonconsensual disclo-
sure provisions. 146 New Hampshire only incorporates FERPA's directory in-
formation provision: "A local education agency which maintains education
records may provide information designated as directory information consistent
with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).' 47  Montana
limits FERPA's provisions only to matters of disclosure to the juvenile justice
system148 while Oregon includes that and the provisions for disclosure to law
141 NEv. REV. ST. § 386.655(1)(a).
142 ARtz. REV. STAT. §§ 15-141A & 15-1043 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
143 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 5001-A.
144 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(2).
145 MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-15-3 (2001).
146 WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.605.030 (Supp. 2005). The Washington statute is rather hard to
follow insofar as it suggests that student records may be disclosed without consent in accordance
with FERPA. However, local school districts are instructed to establish procedures prohibiting
the release of student records without parental consent.
147 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:1-e (1999).
148 MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-213(5) (2003); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001(3)
(Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1135(5) (2001) (FERPA limits disclosure to law en-
forcement agencies). Washington incorporates FERPA in only a couple of instances, one of
which is cooperation with the juvenile justice system. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.480 (2004). As
a point of reference, FERPA has carved out a specific, limited exception concerning the disclosure
of student records when disclosed to juvenile justice authorities; disclosure is appropriate pursuant
to specific state statutes governing the same. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1)(E) (2000). These statutes
are also supposed to assure these records will not be further disclosed without written consent of
the parent(s). See generally Stuart, Lex-Praxis, supra note 17. Hence, states are likely to empha-
size special disclosure rules for the juvenile justice system, as in Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-
141D (2002 & Supp. 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(3)(d)(13) (2004 & Supp. 2005); Illi-
nois, 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6(a)(6.5) (1998 & Supp. 2005); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 20-33-7-1 to
-3 (2004); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 280.25 (Supp. 2005); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A § 6001
(Supp. 2004); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 336.187(1)(b) (2003); and WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.480
(2004). A state that does not have such special provisions violates FERPA when its local school
districts hand over student records to the juvenile justice system.
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enforcement agencies when necessary for the health and safety of the student
and others.149
On the other hand, some states have actually mimicked FERPA by
drafting their own mini-FERPAs that govern access to and disclosure of student
records. 50 Some of these state "mini-FERPAs" are complex and intricate, such
as California's, which is more comprehensive than FERPA itself. California's
pupil records protection includes specific statutory provisions for parental notice
of access to student records,' 5' maintenance of logs noting persons requesting
and receiving access to student records, 152 release of directory information,1
53
and regulation of access to and disclosure of records to third parties. 54 Equally
inclusive is Florida's mini-FERPA, the purpose of which is to
protect the rights of students and their parents with respect to
student records and reports as created, maintained, and used by
public educational institutions of the state. The intent of the
Legislature is that students and their parents shall have rights of
access, rights of challenge, and rights of privacy with respect to
such records and reports, and that rules shall be available for the
exercise of these rights.1
55
Similarly comprehensive are the Illinois School Student Records Act, 56 the
Kentucky Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 57 the Colorado statute for
the protection of student data, 58 and the Wisconsin pupil records act, 59 all of
which provide for parental notice and access and limited disclosure to certain
third parties.
149 OR. REV. STAT. § 336.187(1)(a).
150 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49060-49079 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4111 (1999 &
Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. § 1002.22 (2004 & Supp. 2005); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10.
(1998 & Supp. 2005); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.710 (West 1999); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
3319.321 (LexisNexis 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-287 (West 2001 & Supp. 2005); WIS. STAT.
§ 118.125 (2004).
151 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49063.
152 Id. § 49064.
'53 Id. § 49073.
154 Id. §§ 49075-77.
155 FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(1).
156 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 to 10/10 (1998 & Supp. 2005).
157 KY.-REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 160.700-.730 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004). Kentucky presumes
student records are confidential. Id. § 160.705(1).
158 COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-1-123 (2004). Colorado's statute is a blend of its own FERPA-like
organization while periodically incorporating federal statutory citations, such as FERPA's.
159 WIS. STAT. § 118.125 (2004). Wisconsin's statute, like Kentucky's, starts with the premise
that pupil records are confidential then lists numerous exceptions to that confidentiality. Wis.
STAT. § 118.125(2).
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Some state statutes pattern themselves after FERPA but provide more
presumptive privacy rights. For example, the Florida student privacy statute is
the most rigorous in the country although it is similar to FERPA in many re-
spects in its regulation of parental access, parental notice, and nonconsensual
disclosures. Florida's legislative purpose is that
[e]very student has a right of privacy with respect to the educa-
tional records kept on him or her. Personally identifiable re-
cords or reports of a student, and any personal information con-
tained therein, are confidential and exempt from s. 119.07(1)
[open records act]. A state or local educational agency, board,
public school, career center, or public postsecondary educa-
tional institution may not permit the release of such records, re-
ports, or information without the written consent of the student's
parent, or of the student himself or herself if he or she is quali-
fied as provided in this subsection, to any individual, agency, or
organization.' 6
Similarly, Delaware's mini-FERPA denotes all student "personal" records as
confidential and, unlike FERPA, restricts non-school disclosure only to parents
and to government agencies for "public health, safety, law enforcement or na-
tional security" when pursuant to "law or court order." 161 The major exemption
in the Delaware statute allows only for consensual disclosure of school records
to potential employers and institutions of higher education. 162 In sum, states
have engrafted privacy onto FERPA where such privacy does not otherwise
exist.
FERPA has been instrumental in guiding state legislatures in enacting
their own versions of education records privacy protections. Similarly, it has
been instrumental in guiding state education departments in drafting privacy
regulations.
Rather than enact FERPA-like statutes, other states have formulated
FERPA-like regulations. Although a complete rundown of all the regulations
adopted by any particular state board of education is beyond the scope of this
Article, school districts must be aware that such regulations exist as they too are
enforceable in protecting student record privacy. School districts must be aware
that these regulations might be fairly strict, such as in Massachusetts, where
state regulations provide that no third party shall have access to information in
or from student records without specific, informed written consent of the eligi-
ble student or parents. 163 West Virginia has likewise been influenced by FERPA
160 FLA. STAT. § 1022.22(3)(d) (Supp. 2005).
161 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 411 l(a)(1) (1999).
162 Id. § 4111 (a)(2).
163 Commonwealth v. Buccella, 751 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth v. Nathan-
iel N., 764 N.E.2d 883, 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). In Nathaniel N., the court relied on 603
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in one of its state education rules.164 In coordination with its statutory right to
privacy, Pennsylvania's Department of Education regulations require that local
school districts adopt FERPA-type rules concerning disclosure of and access to
student records.1 65  And New Jersey has a regulatory scheme that mirrors
FERPA yet places on the local districts a great deal of responsibility for formu-
lating their own policies.1 66 Even by regulatory regime, FERPA has influenced
privacy policy at the state level.
Many state legislatures have taken up the banner of student privacy and
have done so by mimicking the intent and format of the federal FERPA to pro-
tect student records. In their various forms, these statutes and regulations pose
challenges to school districts who may be more inclined to follow FERPA rather
than more restrictive state statutes. Insofar as these state statutes are not ex-
pressly preempted by FERPA and a school district complies with FERPA when
complying with a more restrictive state statute, there is no obstacle to prevent a
district's following state statutes rather than FERPA. 167 This tack is especially
MASS. CODE REGS. 23.07(4) (1995), in determining that a school did not unlawfully fail to provide
juvenile defendant's school records to the police pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. This Massachusetts regulation is a regulatory version of FERPA and a restrictive
version it is: "no third party shall have access to information in or from student records without
specific, informed written consent of the eligible student or parents." Id.; Nathaniel N., 764
N.E.2d at 888. Indeed, the court gave greater force and effect to this state regulation than to
IDEA's suggestion that special education records are to be sent to law enforcement authorities
when special education students are involved.
164 W. Va. Code. R. §§ 126-94-1 to 30 (2003). This State Board of Education Procedural Rule
limit[s] collection and disclosure of information relating to students which is
individually identifiable, generally requiring consent of the parents for disclo-
sure and collection, except when collection is a normal part of the educational
program. Disclosure requires consent of the parents, except when for release
of directory information or in specific circumstances. Students and parents
have the right to review such information, and procedures are established to
amend the records when found to be inaccurate and to challenge disclosures
which are in violation of the policy.
State ex rel. Garden State Newspapers, Inc. v. Hoke, 520 S.E.2d 186, 194-95 (W. Va. 1999) (hold-
ing court did not exceed its power in sealing record of proceedings brought by juvenile against
school district and its administrators because that record included educational records).
165 22 PA. CODE §§ 12.31-.33 (2004); Bd. of Dirs. of Palmyra Area Sch. Dist. v. Palmyra Area
Educ. Ass'n, 644 A.2d 267, 270 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (teachers' union improperly used mailing
list compiled of student names and addresses because not accessed for "legitimate educational
interest"); Parents Against Abuse in Schs. v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 594 A.2d 796, 802-03
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (parents had right of access to school psychologist's notes from inter-
views he conducted of students who had suffered physical and mental abuse by a teacher). "The
governing board of every school district, intermediate unit and area vocational-technical
school shall adopt a plan for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of pupil
records and submit the same to the Department for approval." 22 PA. CODE § 12.3 1(a).
166 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6:3-6.1 (2004).
167 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause);
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982).
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important when the litigation stakes are higher under state law than under fed-
eral law.
B. Access Only Statutes
Several states only regulate access to student records.1 68 Unlike the
FERPA-type legislation and regulations, these legislatures apparently presumed
the confidentiality of education records but felt compelled to legislate exemp-
tions to that implicit privacy by affirmatively allowing access.
These statutes are reminiscent of FERPA but only address access to stu-
dent records and are in a small number of jurisdictions. Ohio's student records
access statute looks like FERPA but it does not have the same content. Rather,
it is an amalgam of limitations on access to student records. 169 Also rather
FERPA-like are Virginia's1 70 and Nebraska's 1 7' student records statutes. Instead
of governing student privacy, they govern access to those records.
More straightforward in their focus on access to student records are the
statutes in Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Texas. For example, Texas1 72 and Connecticut1 73 merely establish a parent's
right to access his or her child's education records. Similarly limited is Geor-
gia's treatment of student records: "No local school system . . . shall have a
policy of denying ... parents ... the right to inspect and review the education
records of their child .,,L74 The Rhode Island statute is limited to the rights of
parents, legal guardians, and eligible students. 75 Massachusetts's statutes man-
date that the state board of education create regulations for the "maintenance,
retention, duplication, storage and periodic destruction" of student records, 176
and also provides for specific access to parents, guardians and students over the
age of eighteen. 77 And New Jersey's statute similarly mandates the state board
of education to supply regulations that, among other things, will govern ac-
cess. 1
78
168 See generally Leiter, supra note 138.
169 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3319.321 (2004).
170 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-287 (2001).
171 NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-2,104 (2003).
172 TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.004 (Vernon 1996). These parental rights also seem to extend
to what might otherwise be covered by privilege, like counseling and psychological records.
173 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-15b (2002).
174 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-720 (2005).
175 R.I. GEN. LAWS §16-71-3 (2001).
176 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 34D (2002). The Massachusetts Board of Education has, in-
deed, implemented rigorous regulations pursuant to this statute. See supra note 163.
177 Id. § 34E.
178 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-19 (West 1999).
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What one takes from these access statutes is the feeling that the states
presume privacy of these records and will open them only to limited disclosure.
It is unclear if the express provision of access to some means the implicit denial
of access to others. If so, then these states actually will recognize an enforce-
able right to privacy. However, logic suggests that the very limits of the access
to student records to parents and/or students as set out in some of the statutes
might, perforce, limit access by all others. 179
C. Special Education Records
Special education records in all states have privacy coverage under the
regulations that must be adopted under the Individuals with Disabilities Act
("IDEA").' 80 Just as some states have adopted miniature versions of FERPA to
protect the privacy of education records, so to have all states adopted similar
versions of the Department of Education's regulations for special education.. 18'
The IDEA requires that the states conform to its statutory mandates and adopt
regulations similar to those formulated by the Department of Education in ex-
change for partial federal funding of education for children with disabilities.'
82
Among those state-crafted regulations must be provisions protecting the school
records of qualifying students under the Act. 183 As a consequence, under any
state regime for the protection of student records, special education records are
universally and unequivocally protected private information by state regulation
rather than by statute. Generally, such regulations must provide for notice and
access to parents concerning these records. 84 Two notably distinct protections
cover special education students' files under these regulations: nonconsensual
disclosures of student information may only be for compliance with and provi-
sion of services under IDEA; 85 and school districts must have an individual
designated to maintain the confidentiality of these files. 86 Thus, as mandated
by IDEA, states afford greater privacy rights to special education students than
to general education students.
179 "Expressio unius est exclusion alterius." This rule of statutory construction stands for the
principle that when a legislative body expressly enumerates items in a statute, then others not so
enumerated are presumed excluded. See, e.g., TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 29 (2001).
180 20 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000); 34 C.F.R. § 300.127 (2004).
181 20 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see generally Peter Walker & Sara Jane Steinberg, Confidentiality of
Educational Records: Serious Risks for Parents and School Districts, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 11 (1997).
182 20 U.S.C. § 1407.
183 "The State must have on file in detail the policies and procedures that the State has under-
taken to ensure protection of the confidentiality of any personally identifiable information, col-
lected, used, or maintained .. " 34 C.F.R. § 300.127 (2004).
184 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.560-300.577.
185 See 34 C.F.R. §300.572(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500(b)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.571.
186 34 C.F.R. § 300.572(b); Buckley I, supra note 132, at 646; see also Stuart, Lex-Praxis, su-
pra note 17.
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At least three states, Alaska, New York, and Nevada, have also enacted
specific state statutes that regulate access to and disclosure of special education
student records. Alaska's statute places access and disclosure matters up to the
parents. 87 New York requires that the state department of education write regu-
lations governing privacy of special education records. 88 A bit more generally,
Nevada has incorporated the IDEA and its regulations into its automated infor-
mation system. 189 Other than those three states, the rest seem to be resting on
the protections provided by their regulations patterned on those drafted by the
Department of Education to cover their special education records under the
IDEA.
D. Reaping the Whirlwind: Enforcing Statutory Rights
The affirmative enforceability of these state statutes and regulations is
what will make them more valuable and clearly more powerful than FERPA.
After Gonzaga University v. Doe, FERPA has virtually no life left for vindicat-
ing individual privacy rights. Thus, state statutes could become the new "club"
for requiring school districts to honor the privacy of student records. Congress's
power to govern the states through its spending powers (or its commerce pow-
ers) does not have similar parallels with the power that state legislatures have to
regulate state citizens. 90 State courts are more likely to interpret their privacy
statutes to include personal rights than to be diluted as mere funding statutes.
Consequently, enforcing personal privacy rights pursuant to state statutes
through a private right of action may be significantly easier under state than
under federal statutes, at least so long as the legislature intended to create some
right to be vindicated by litigation. 191
187 ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.272(a)(8) (2004): "A school district shall inform the parent of a
child with a disability of the right... to give consent or deny access to others to the child's educa-
tional record." Perhaps this statute would not be so broadly interpreted, but the plain meaning of
the statute indicates that there is no place for nonconsensual disclosure of these records, even to
educational personnel.
188 The charge to the state department is
[t]o make provision by regulation of the commissioner to assure the confiden-
tiality of any personally identifiable data, information, and records collected
or maintained by the state department of education or any school district, in-
cluding a committee or subcommittee on special education, and the officers,
employees or members thereof, pursuant to or in furtherance of the purposes
of this article, and shall establish procedures upon which any such personally
identifiable data, information, or records may be disclosed.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4403(9) (McKinney 2001).
189 NEV. REV. STAT. 386.655(2) (2003). The statute also incorporates "any other applicable
federal law."
190 See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002).
191 Such intent can be determined as follows: When " 'it appears that the duty imposed [by
statute] is ... for the benefit of particular individuals or classes of individuals, a private right of
action arises for injury sustained by reason of the breach, by any person the statute was designed
2005]
25
Stuart: A Local Distinction: State Education Privacy Laws for Public Scho
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
A school district might argue that there exists no such private right of
action inuring to these statutes except in instances where a specific right exists
in the statute, as in Florida,192 or where a specific cause of action exists, as in
Illinois. 193 However, those fine points did not even come up in the handful of
cases that school districts, students, and others have used to protect or gain ac-
cess to student records. Most of such cases have been access cases in which
someone other than the statutorily designated individuals wanted access to the
records. 194 One can conclude that these statutes' enforcement for access pur-
poses indicates the courts' willingness to vindicate individual rights under these
statutes, thereby assuring that all other privacy rights likewise would be vindi-
cated.
Florida, which has the strictest student privacy protections, has also had
the most reported litigation in this area. For instance, one court granted Florida
State University's motion to quash a subpoena requesting the production of
formal orders in student conduct code cases. Even though the subpoena allowed
for the redaction of identifying information, the Florida Court of Appeals de-
termined that these formal orders were confidential records and reports. Be-
cause Florida's privacy statutes made no provision for partial disclosure of such
records and reports, the proposed redaction would still not fulfill the legal re-
strictions on disclosure. 195 Florida's statutory restrictions were intended to pro-
to protect, provided the injury sustained by him is a special injury different from that inflicted on
the general public, and has resulted proximately from and because of the violation."' Bartholo-
mew County Beverage Co. v. Barco Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
The primary considerations for examining legislative intent to create a private right of action are
the creation of a benefited class, the promotion of a legislative purpose by a private right of action,
and consistency with the statutory scheme. E.g., Sheehy v. Big Flats Cmty. Day, Inc., 541 N.E.2d
18, 20 (N.Y. 1989). A cause of action may be implied even without the provision of an express
remedy. E.g., Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 432 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1982). See
generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 Hastings L.J. 877
(2003).
192 "[S]tudents and their parents shall have rights of access, rights of challenge, and rights of
privacy with respect to such records and reports .... " FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(1) (2004).
193 "Any person injured by a willful or negligent violation of this Act [Illinois School Student
Records Act] may institute an action for damages in the Circuit Court of the County in which the
violation has occurred or the Circuit Court of the County in which the school is located. 105 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 10/9(b) (1998 & Supp. 2005); see also 105 II. Comp. Stat. 10/9(a); John K. v. Bd. of
Educ. for Sch. Dist. No. 65, 504 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (parents entitled to injunctive
relief to gain access to student records).
194 Access cases might be otherwise litigated under the applicable state open records law.
However, these were actually pursued under the affirmative privacy statutes.
195 Fla. State Univ. v. Hatton, 672 So. 2d 576, 578-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on
FLA. STAT. § 228.093(3)(d) now FLA. STAT. § 1002.22.) Similarly, University of Florida's honor
court proceedings are not "public meetings" because discussion therein might include confidential
student records. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 341 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
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vide affirmative confidentiality to student records 96 and not just to exempt them
from public disclosure in certain circumstances. Indeed, Florida prides itself on
providing greater protections than FERPA.1
97
Other state court cases involve the partial protection of student records
by limiting access only to student information that is masked or not personally
identifiable. 198 Those courts generally treated student records statutes as making
records absolutely confidential from public disclosure unless the request was for
solely statistical information.'99 Regardless of the parties involved, school dis-
tricts should recognize that litigation and privately enforceable rights are inher-
ent in these privacy statutes. Thus, these statutes bring greater risks to school
districts in terms of immediate outlays for attorney fees (and perhaps damages)
than do federal laws purporting to protect student records.
V. SUNSHINE LAWS PROTECTING STUDENT RECORDS
A. The Protection
Often, the matter of student record privacy arises when the school dis-
trict is being held accountable by a member of the public requesting information
under a state open records law. Hence, one might consider it unusual to find
protection for student records in these laws. Open records laws accommodate
the concept that governments must be accountable to their citizens and that gov-
ernment agencies should be "transparent" for public oversight.200 Therefore, the
public may access many records held by the government. However, student
records are often exempted from such access.
196 See, e.g., Johnson v. Deluz, 875 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004). In Johnson v. Deluz, the
Florida Court of Appeals determined that, even though teachers might usually be considered a
party with access to confidential student information, that right had limits. Id. Consequently, a
school board had to redact all identifying student information from an investigative report con-
cerning a principal when teachers requested a copy of that report. Id.
197 WFTV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), review
denied, 892 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2004) (TV station could not access redacted Transportation Student
Discipline Forms or surveillance videotapes).
198 See, e.g., Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (111.
1989) (Illinois Student Records Act does not protect information by which no individual student
may be identified); Human Rights Auth. of Ill. Guardianship & Advocacy Comm'n v. Miller, 464
N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Disclosure of testing and statistical information is clearly at
the forefront of so-called school reform efforts and accountability movements. Unfortunately, the
scope of this Article is not intended to travel in that territory.
199 See, e.g., Hardin County Schs. v. Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868-69 (Ky. 2001) (statistical
disciplinary data that does not contain personally identifiable student information is not confiden-
tial under student records act); see also Fish v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 S.W.3d 678, 681-83
(Tex. App. 2000) (court relied, in part, on state statute that protected student records as confiden-
tial in considering whether or not to allow disclosure of testing information identified by test
number, gender, age and ethnicity).
200 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution,
86 MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1173 (2002).
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Each state legislature has enacted an open records statute, 201 also called
"freedom of information" acts, "open access" acts, and "sunshine" laws.
202
What these statutes do is assure access to public information so that govern-
ments do not operate in secret.203 However, not all public records are subject to
disclosure; no sunshine law mandates "absolute disclosure." 2°  Instead, there
are exemptions from disclosure for those public records that the legislature
deems of such a nature - usually having a "privacy" interest - to which the pub-
lic should not be privy. One category of information to which this exempting
method of "privacy protection" applies is student records.
Of course, this category of exemption within a sunshine law assumes
student records are actually public records. 205 That is not always true. North
Carolina has enacted a statute that specifically states that student records are
simply not public records at all: "The official record of each student is not a
public record as the term 'public record' is defined by [the public records act].
The official record shall not be subject to inspection and examination as author-
,206ized by [the public records act]." Other state legislatures have implied a simi-
lar result by enacting separate privacy statutes for student records, making them
"confidential" and therefore not subject to disclosure. As discussed above, a
state with a comprehensive student records act usually considers those records
outside the purview of the open records acts. Florida's education records pri-
vacy statute207 is such an example as is Illinois's School Records Act.2°8  In-
deed, student records in Florida are affirmatively confidential, not negatively
201 Kristen M. Blankley, Are Public Records too Public? Why Personally Identifying Informa-
tion Should Be Removed from Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 01-10 ST.
L.J. 413, 428 n.68 (2004).); Case Comment, Open Records - Agencies or Custodians Affected:
The North Dakota Supreme Court Expands the Scope of North Dakota's Open Records Law, 75
N.D. L. REv. 745, 749 n.25 (1996).
202 Solove, supra note 200, at 1160-6 1.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1162.
205 In a related article, I opine that student records are not public records at all: they belong to
the students and their parents and the school is the government keeper. See generally Stuart, Lex-
Praxis, supra note 17. These aren't records that the government must keep as a government
agency; they are records the government keeps in order to better educate. This function also
makes them distinct from employee personnel records kept by government agencies that have a
direct impact on the working of the agency. Instead, student records have virtually nothing to do
with the administration of the government function of the school, apart from statistical informa-
tion required to be kept when the school is acting as a governmental agency.
206 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-402(e) (2003); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (2003)
(higher education student records are not "government records" in New Jersey).
207 FLA. STAT. § 1002.22(3)(d) (2004).
208 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 (1998 & Supp. 2005); see also Bowie v. Evanston Cmty. Consol.
Sch. Dist.. No. 65, 538 N.E.2d 557, 559-60 (111. 1989).
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exempted from disclosure.2 09 Likewise, student records have specific confiden-
21 211tiality in Wisconsin and in Kentucky.
Many state sunshine laws themselves, however, impliedly regard stu-
dent records as public records but extend them a modicum of privacy protection
through the traditional means of listing them as specific exemptions from public
disclosure. For instance, Colorado exempts addresses and telephone numbers of
public school students212 and "scholastic achievement data on individual
persons ' 213 while one of Iowa's exemptions keeps confidential the following
public records: "[p]ersonal information in records regarding a student, prospec-
tive student, or former student maintained, created, collected or assembled by
or for a school corporation or educational institution maintaining such re-214 215 216
cords. Similar protections exist in New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Ver-
mont, 2 7 Tennessee,2 1 8 Washington, 21 9 and Wisconsin. 220 Wyoming in a nod to
its Old West roots, exempts nearly everything under its public records act in
"[s]chool district records containing information relating to the biography, fam-
ily, physiology, religion, academic achievement and physical or mental ability
209 See, e.g., WFTV, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole, 874 So. 2d 48, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004),
review denied, 892 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 2004).
210 WIS. STAT. § 118.125(2) (2004) ("All pupil records maintained by a public school shall be
confidential, except as provided [herein]."). However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has inter-
preted this provision as an exemption to the state public records act. Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist.
No. 1, City of Green Bay, 342 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (Wis. 1984).
211 "Education records of students in the public educational institutions in this state are deemed
confidential and shall not be disclosed, or the contents released, except under the circumstances
described in [this Act]." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.705(1) (West 1999). The Kentucky Supreme
Court too views this provision as an exemption to the state's open records act rather than an af-
firmative statement by the legislature that these are not public records. Hardin County Schs. v.
Foster, 40 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Ky. 2001). That interpretation is a bit difficult to fathom given the
plain meaning of the statutory language.
212 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(3)(a)(VI) (2004).
213 COLO. REv. STAT § 24-72-204(3)(a)(I); Sargent Sch. Dist. No. RE-33J v. W. Servs., Inc.,
751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 1988).
214 IOWA CODE § 22.7(1) (2001).
215 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A4 (2001); Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976, 983 (N.H. 1989).
216 OKLA STAT. tit. 51, § 24A.16 (2000). In Oklahoma, student records are kept "confidential"
along with "teacher lesson plans, test and other teaching material" and "personal communications
concerning individual students." Id.
217 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317 (1996).
218 TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-504(a)(4) (1999).
219 WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.310 (2000).
220 Wisconsin's open records act exclusions have been interpreted to specifically incorporate
the pupil confidentiality statutes. WIS. STAT. § 19.36(1) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 118.125(2); State ex
rel. Blum v. Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist. of Johnson Creek, 565 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)
(ruling that interim pupil grades are pupil records exempt from disclosure in a student dispute over
GPAs and scholarship selection).
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of any student except to the person in interest or to the officials duly elected and
appointed to supervise him.
221
Other states' exemptions are a bit more convoluted, and even repetitive
of other statutes, by carving out parts of records as being exempt or by incorpo-
rating FERPA's exemptions within their sunshine laws. As a backup to its
School Student Records Act, Illinois's freedom of information act exempts
"files and personal information maintained with respect to ... students .... 222
Maryland, on the other hand, includes its school records protections among the
specifically denominated exemptions to its public records act.223  Similarly,
Michigan 224 and Arkansas22s expressly incorporate FERPA as an exemption to
their sunshine laws. Texas exempts "in conformity with" FERPA.226  Others
"protect" student record privacy because the legislature exempts from disclosure
those records that are protected by federal law, like FERPA227 and the IDEA,
either specifically or generally.228
Other states more broadly offer protections by generally incorporating
applicable state laws 2 2 9 such as Oregon, which exempts "[s]tudent records re-
quired by state or federal law to be exempt from disclosure., 230 Similarly, Vir-
ginia protects scholastic records from disclosure when "prohibited by law.",
231
221 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-203(d)(viii) (2005).
222 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(b)(i) (1988 & Supp. 2005); see also Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 773 N.E.2d 674, 682 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (school board properly denied
reporter's FOIA request concerning personal information of over one million students, including
information about school, room number, medical status, special education status, race, lunch
status, grade point average, date of birth, and standardized test scores).
223 MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-616(k) (LexisNexis 2004); see also Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 721 A.2d 196, 203 (Md. 1998) (stating in dictum that FERPA is federal law that
would exempt records from disclosure).
224 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 15.243(1)(t)(2) (2001); see generally Connoisseur Communication of
Flint, L.P. v. Univ. of Mich., 584 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
225 ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(2) (Michie 2002) (stating that the Arkansas act exempts
"education records as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ...
unless their disclosure is consistent with the provisions of that act ...."). See also Ark. Gazette
Co. v. S. State Coll., 620 S.W.2d 258 (Ark. 1981).
226 TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.026 (2004).
227 But see generally Or. County R-IV Sch. Dist. v. LeMon, 739 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). In a rather convoluted opinion, the Missouri Court of Appeals determined that stu-
dent names, addresses and telephones were not exempt from disclosure under the state's sunshine
law, even though there is an exemption "as otherwise provided by law" and FERPA did not qual-
ify as such law prohibiting disclosure because this information otherwise fit within disclosable
"directory information.").
228 See Tamu K. Walton, Protecting Student Privacy: Reporting Campus Crimes as an Alter-
native to Disclosing Student Disciplinary Records, 77 IND. L.J. 143, 153 n.78 (2002).
229 Id. at 153-54 n.79.
230 OR. REV. STAT. § 192.496(4) (2003).
231 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.4 (2001). Virginia's exemption also provides access for parents
but other access may be prohibited upon request by any parent for students under eighteen.
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New York allows public agencies to exempt records from disclosure if ex-
empted under state or federal law.232 One California court has interpreted such
general protections to cover student records even though California's Public
Records Act would have required disclosure of student disciplinary records be-
cause that Act also has an exemption pursuant to federal law.233 The court de-
termined that, because FERPA included student disciplinary records as educa-
tional records under its protection, those disciplinary records were not subject to
disclosure.2 4 Indiana similarly forbids public disclosure of student records be-
cause of its sunshine law's incorporation of federal law exemptions. 235 In sum-
mary, sunshine laws - the antithesis of privacy - provide some of the most spe-
cific protections for student records.
One odd exemption is in Michigan, where the public records act offers
more general protection against disclosures that are considered to be unwar-
ranted invasions of privacy.236 In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University,237
the court of appeals determined that exemption applied to a magnetic tape that a
state university used to produce a student directory. The court averred that the
state's freedom of information act was not designed to honor a request to de-
velop mailing lists for political purposes when it sought disclosure of student
information given to the university for a completely different purpose.238 In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the similar exemption and rationale
underlying the federal Freedom of Information Act, that disclosure is prohibited
if it constitutes an invasion of privacy.239 If state sunshine laws are interpreted
232 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW§ 87 (McKinney 2001); see also Kryston v. Bd. of Educ., E. Ramapo
Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (FERPA is one of those statutes
that would fit within the statutory exemption).
233 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250 (West 2002); Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct.,
129 Cal Rptr. 2d 11, 12-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
234 Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal Rptr. 2d at 15; accord Osborn v. Bd. of Re-
gents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 647 N.W.2d 158, 170 (Wis. 2002) (race and gender statistical data
derived from university admissions application is accessible by researcher who is not otherwise
seeking personally identifiable information protected by FERPA, WIs. STAT. § 19.35(1)(9)
(2003)).
235 IND. CODE § 5-14-3-4 (2001); Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. Newspapers v. Trs. of
Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
236 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(13)(1)(a) (2001).
237 294 N.W.2d 228, 234-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982).
238 Id. at 236; see also Brent v. Paquette, 567 A.2d 976, 983-84 (N.H. 1989) (students' and
parents' names and addresses exempt from disclosure under state's Right-to-Know statute's ex-
emption against disclosure of information that would constitute an invasion of privacy).
239 Kestenbaum, 294 N.W.2d at 233. FOIA even has express language in it that prohibits ac-
cess to "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2000). Additional lan-
guage protects information that "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted inva-
sion of person privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C); see generally Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding
Private Lives from prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict between Constitutional Privacy and the
Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71 (2003).
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as impliedly shielding certain information in order to prevent an invasion of
privacy, these statutes may protect an even broader range of information than
just their specifically enumerated exemptions. Even if student records are not
specifically exempted, they would be impliedly exempted under the public's
reasonable expectation to be free of unwarranted invasions of privacy. Indeed,
the Supreme Court recently expanded FOIA's protection to prohibit disclosure
of death-scene photographs that would have invaded the privacy of surviving
family members.24° Hence, the breadth of protection under sunshine laws may
not be confined to specifically enumerated prohibitions but may cover student
records under a much broader range of protection. This opens the door to ex-
panded use of the courts by students and their parents.
B. The Litigation
School districts are - or should be - aware of the dangers involved in
public record requests. Accessing any statutory annotation for any sunshine law
will likely yield reported litigation, usually because the government has refused
access. 241 Refusal is often the correct response, but that does not stop the re-
quester from pursuing a lawsuit. Thus, sometimes the public's request for ac-
cess to school information presents a school district with a no-win situation. To
that extent, sunshine laws are fraught with more litigation dangers than federal
privacy laws. On the other hand, although the exposure exists, it is somewhat
less exposure to student-initiated litigation.
The genesis of any student-initiated litigation for release of information
under sunshine laws is the inherent clash between the purpose of those laws for
government accountability and the individual citizen's sense that some govern-
ment records are too private for public disclosure. Courts for nearly a century
have recognized this "sense" by formulating remedies for common law invasion
of torts, 242 first elucidated in the well-known and oft-cited 1890 Harvard Law
Review article, The Right to Privacy.243 The privacy tort most often used for the
240 Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied, 541
U.S. 1057 (2004).
241 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552.
242 The four major invasion of privacy torts are found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652(A) (1977):
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another.. . or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness. .. ; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life.. .; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably placed the other in a false light before the
public ....
243 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The implicit made explicit],
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890) in PHILoSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 75
(Ferdinand David Schoeman, ed. 1984).
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unauthorized release of information is the civil wrong of making private facts
public.2" Courts have incorporated these tort concepts into the analyses of
whether or not to release information under sunshine laws.245 To the extent
these sunshine laws are in derogation of the common law right of privacy, they
might fairly be restricted and applied narrowly.246
However, independent tort actions against government agencies solely
for recovery under the tort are few and far between and will rarely be successful
for wrongful disclosure of private information held by the government because
of the heavy burden on a plaintiff.247 Such actions are made difficult because
the tort usually requires proof that the publicized information was not actually a
matter of public concern.248 The only school records case involving the tort was
not successful. In Louisiana, a school board member obtained and forwarded a
student's records to the state department of education for an investigation into
allegations of grade-changing. 249 The court determined that those actions did
not constitute an invasion of privacy because there was no violation of the stu-
dent's expectation of privacy nor an improper public disclosure.25 °
All this is not to suggest that the invasion of privacy tort may not prove
useful in these situations. There are a handful of cases by which individuals
have sued private individuals - as opposed to governmental entities - and suc-
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977): "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy,
if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." But see Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Fav-
ish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004), reh'g denied, 541 U.S. 1057 (2004) (holding that photographs of
deceased would constitute an intrusion into the privacy of the family).
245 See, e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 167-70 (2004), reh'g
denied 541 U.S. 1057 (2004); Dept. of Children v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 710 A.2d 1378,
1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998); Seattle Firefighters v. Hollister, 737 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987)); accord O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (3d Cir. 1989); Doe v.
Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Kan. 2003).
246 See Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 686 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (contrasting privacy
statute and common law right to privacy); Williams v. Matthews, 448 S.E.2d 625, 628 (Va. 1994)
(statute authorizing seizure of property in derogation of right to privacy). See generally Edmund-
son v. Rivera, 363 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Conn. 1975); Summers v. Summers, 239 N.E.2d 795, 798
(Ill. 1968); Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co., 309 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Mich. 1981).
247 See, e.g., Rocque v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 774 A.2d 957, 962-63 (Conn. 2001).
248 See, e.g., Hatch v. Town of Middletown, 311 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2002); Dept. of Children
v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 710 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998). This may well be a
recognition that access to government records also has common law underpinnings. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers,
711 A.2d 1131, 1135 (R.I. 1998).
249 Young v. St. Landry Parish Sch. Bd., 673 So. 2d 1272, 1275-76 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
250 Young, 673 So. 2d at 1275-76; see also Doe v. Unified Sch. Dist., 255 F.Supp.2d 1239,
1249-50 (D. Kan. 2003) (school board member's disclosure of information to a single person did
not constitute publicity for privacy tort); accord Williamson ex rel. Williamson v. Keith, 786 So.
2d 390, 396 (Miss. 2003) (school board lawyer not liable for invasion of privacy for subpoenaing
special education records because there was no publicity).
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ceeded in proving unlawful disclosure of private information.25' Under the cir-
cumstances, the risk of tort litigation under sunshine laws is pretty minimal,
given the large number of cases that do not succeed.252 However, school offi-
cials do risk some harm from such tort suits even if the plaintiff is unsuccessful,
especially if the suit is instituted against a school official as a private individual
rather than as a public official, even if only in costs and attorney fees.
In the main, sunshine laws have proved effective in protecting student
records and private information therein on explicit statutory terms. Courts have
usually been assiduous in preventing access to personal information in school
records under sunshine laws. Courts have even gone so far as to engraft tort
notions of privacy in a broader sense to cast a greater protective shadow over
school records. Regardless of the minimal success of the tort itself in matters of
records, the sunshine laws on their own terms have proved successful in provid-
ing protection, especially more successful than federal laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
School districts ignore their state constitutions, state statutes, and state
regulations governing the privacy of student records at their peril. It is easy and
comfortable to follow the federal statutes and regulations and assume they fol-
low the same principles and provide the same protection as state law. They do
not. In many cases, the federal laws conflict with state laws. When the state
laws afford greater rights than the federal laws, the school districts run the seri-
ous risk of entangling themselves in disputes not anticipated by the guidance
and policies formulated by the United States Department of Education. Most
state laws are more restrictive about privacy protections than the federal laws
and have more likelihood of creating litigation problems than federal laws.
The use of state laws to vindicate civil rights in other areas of the law is
beginning to affect the particular vindication of privacy rights. School districts
are familiar with privacy protections under federal law, but not as familiar with
their respective state laws. Although school districts are often the bulwark for
preventing public access under sunshine laws, they must also be attentive to the
more particularized details of state laws. This "brave new world" of state litiga-
tion is destined to expand as litigants abandon federal remedies for state reme-
dies. This "brave new world" makes familiarity with the "local distinction" of
state privacy laws imperative.
251 E.g., Hill v. MCI World-Corn Commc'ns, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1213-15 (S.D. Iowa
2001); Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 104 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 671
N.W.2d 849 (Wis. 2003). But see Olson v. Red Cedar Clinic, 681 N.W.2d 306, 308-10 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004), review denied, 687 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2004) (clinic's transmission of medical records
to school psychologist was not an invasion of privacy under Wisconsin statute because there was
no public disclosure).
252 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (appendices).
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